









RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MERGER GAINS AND 
ECONOMIC CYCLE 
 






















Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 





Author  Aleksi Kilpi 
Title of thesis  Relationship between merger gains and economic cycle 
Degree  Bachelor’s 
Degree programme  Finance 
Thesis advisor(s)  Joni Kokkonen 
Year of approval  2020 Number of pages  36 Language English   
Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the effect economic cycle has on merger gains of public companies 
incorporated in the USA. Completed mergers announced from 1990 to 2019 with a value over 
$50M are subject to this study. The economic cycle is divided into two categories: normal or 
strong economy and weak economy, and the mergers are classified into said categories based 
on their announcement dates. The merger gains are measured as cumulative abnormal 
announcement returns and as three-year post-merger buy-and-hold abnormal returns. My 
results show that the mergers initiated during periods of weak economy have significantly 
weaker three-year post-merger performance compared to the ones initiated during good or 
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1.1 Contribution of this thesis 
 
In this thesis, I establish a relationship between weak economic situation at the time of merger 
announcement and weakened performance of the participants’ stocks. The relationship is tested with 
linear regressions, where abnormal returns of mergers’ participants during the announcement periods 
and during the three-year post-merger periods are the dependent variables, and dummy variables 
indicating, whether the merger is announced during a period of weak economy, are the primary 
explanatory variables. This effect of weakened performance is observed as negative and statistically 
significant regression coefficients of weak economy – variables in regressions of both, the 
announcement period’s abnormal returns and three-year post-merger abnormal returns.  
 
No studies strictly considering the relationship between economic cycle and merger gains have been 
published in the leading financial journals, albeit mergers are an extensively studied phenomenon in 
finance. Thereby, as far as I know, the found relationship between weak economy and weakened returns 
of merging companies has not yet been recognized in the field of finance. 
 
Additionally, I recognize, that in my sample, mergers occurring on merger waves underperform mergers 
occurring off waves in the post-merger period, which is a broadly accepted phenomenon among 
researchers. Furthermore, I document tender offers yielding higher announcement period returns for the 
acquiror and the target, and average announcement period returns being slightly negative for acquirors 







1.2 Theoretical framework 
 
Because academic finance has not studied the relationship between economic stage and merger gains, 
there are no previous studies that would be strictly comparable. Thereby, I strive to develop a theoretical 
framework for my study primarily by applying the findings of largely merger wave - focused literature. 
However, in the field of strategic management and business-oriented economics Kusewitt (1985); 
Pangarkar and Lie (2004) and Tse and Soufani (2001) have studied subjects related to the subject of this 
thesis, and next I briefly address their findings.  
 
Kusewitt (1985) concludes that merger’s timing on the market cycle and long-term returns of the 
acquiror have negative correlation. Nonetheless, Kusewitt studies only very active acquirers, and uses 
market cycle as a proxy instead of economic cycle. Pangarkar and Lie (2004) study 115 Singaporean 
acquisitions, and find that during weak economy announcement period profits of acquirers have been 
higher and significant at 5% level. However, this result considers only the announcement period, and 
cannot be generalized to other markets because of differences in characteristics of USA’s and 
Singapore’s merger markets and the small sample of the study. Contrarily, Tse and Soufani (2001) 
explore periods of high – and low merger activity in the UK during 1990’s and find indications of weaker 
performance of mergers during economic downturns. 
 
Majority of academic literature in finance finds merger gains being insignificant or slightly negative for 
the acquires’ shareholders (Andrade et. al (2001); Duchin and Schmidt (2013); Servaes (1991)), while 
targets’ shareholders have significantly positive gains. However, Langetieg (1978) shows that the 
calculated results are not always consistent between different methodologies. Indeed, e.g Asquith et. al 
(1983) document positive returns for acquirers, whereas Wang (2018) argues that while acquirors’ gains 
appear slightly negative, potential merger profits are capitalized in their pre-merger valuations, mergers 
thus being in fact value creating. 
 
Academic world is fairly unanimous of the idea that there are a multitude of motives for mergers, and 
that magnitudes of different motives varies over time. Nguyen et. al (2012) make a distinction between 
value increasing and value decreasing motives. Synergies, both operational and financial, are the most 
important value creating motives. On the contrary, the authors name agency-based motives, hubris and 
market timing as value decreasing motives. Based on their results, mergers are often initiated due to a 
combination of several motives, both value increasing and decreasing, which makes it complex to 
accurately assess individual mergers’ motives. This complexity can be seen as varying and often 






There is strong evidence that merger waves are pro-cyclical i.a Komlenovic et. al (2011). However, the 
explanation for this pro-cyclicality divides views of academics. Indeed, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004) argue that high market valuations drive merger waves, while Harford (2005) claims that capital 
liquidity has more explanatory power than the market timing. In addition, Duchin and Schmidt (2013) 
suggest that behavioral reasons, such as managerial herding and several agency problems are stronger 
during merger waves and may in fact amplify these waves.  
 
Duchin and Schmidt (2013) report that on wave acquisitions have significantly weaker post-merger 
performance compared to mergers outside of waves. They document an average -0.22 three-year buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) for on wave acquisitions, while BHAR for off wave acquisitions is 
on average -0.06. The authors suggest this weaker performance is due to diminished shareholder 
supervision, lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity and poorer quality of analysis. They argue 
that CEOs are less likely to be fired after unsuccessful on wave acquisitions, because they just acted 
similar to others.  
 
It is not unambiguous, what kind of effect these factors presented by Duchin and Schmidt (2013) have 
on mergers occurring during weak economy. It is reasonable to argue that during weak economic stages 
companies and CEOs would be under higher pressure and shareholder supervision, and that managerial 
herding and hubris should not lead to unnecessary mergers. Indeed, Pangarkar and Lie (2004) explain 
their results of stronger performance of Singaporean weak - economy acquirers with the absence of this 
detrimental managerial behavior. On the other hand, during weak economy CEOs might still be able to 
justify poor post-merger performance with difficult economic stage, and the quality of analysts’ 
forecasts could be weaker due to higher uncertainty.  
 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) show that market overvaluation raises the probability of mergers 
even without underlying reasons for merging. On the contrary, market undervaluation decreases the 
probability of mergers, including the mergers that would be economically justified. If during weak 
economy market is indeed undervalued and that undervaluation halts mergers, a major share of mergers 
occurring under weak economy could be so-called forced mergers. Duchin and Schmidt (2013) suggest 
that the returns of these forced mergers are expected to be lower, because they are not initiated by choice 







2. Research questions and hypothesis development 
  
The main objective of my study is to find out, whether abnormal merger gains are different during weak 
economical stages than during normal or strong economy. Thereby, my primary research question is; 
Does weak economy affect the abnormal merger gains? As a secondary research objective, I examine 
how the abnormal returns of on wave mergers compare to the abnormal returns of off wave mergers, in 
order to replicate the commonly accepted phenomenon of merger waves being value destructive. 
 
Empirical theory and academic literature provide evidence of several factors affecting merger gains. A 
large part of these factors has different behaviors depending on the economic stage. Thereby, it is 
reasonable to assume that weak economy would affect abnormal merger gains. However, arguments 
supporting both, weaker and stronger performance of mergers occurring during weak economy can be 
developed. Arguments for stronger performance of mergers during weak economy can be based on 
absence of behavioral reasons such as hubris and managerial herding, that according to Duchin and 
Schmidt (2013) are likely to lead to economically unjustified mergers and weaker performance. Indeed, 
Pangarkar and Lie (2004) document stronger announcement period performance of Singaporean 
mergers during weak economy and explain their result with absence of these detrimental factors.  
 
On the contrary, a larger share of forced mergers could lead to a weaker performance of mergers during 
weak economy. This argument is supported by findings of Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) 
considering market undervaluation’s tendency to halt also economically justified mergers, and Duchin 
and Schmidt’s (2013) reasoning of lower yield of forced mergers. If majority of economically justified 
mergers are called off because of the low liquidity and high uncertainty that often characterize the 
periods of weak economy, and a large part of the mergers occurring during those periods are done by 
necessity, expected abnormal returns for weak economy mergers would be weaker than the returns 
during other economical stages. 
 
Thereby, the null hypothesis for the primary research question is that weak economy does not have an 
effect on the abnormal merger gains, which would imply that the factors with assumed opposite impacts 
cancel each other out, or their behavior is not dependent on the economic stage. The alternative 
hypothesis H1 is that weak economy has an effect on the abnormal merger gains. H1 can be divided into 
H1a: Mergers initiated during weak economy outperform other mergers, which would support the 
positive contribution of the absence of detrimental behavioral reasons during weak economy, and H1b: 
Mergers initiated during weak economy underperform other mergers, which would support the negative 







3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1 Sample selection 
 
My data consists of completed US domestic mergers announced between 1990 and 2019, where the 
announcement date is defined as the first public announcement of merger intentions from the acquiror 
or the target. Both, the acquiror and the target, have to be public companies listed in the USA. Mergers 
are required to have a deal value of at least $50M, and the relative size of the acquiror and the target 
has to fulfill the following restriction: 𝑀𝑉!"#$%& 𝑀𝑉'()*+#,#⁄ ≥ 0.1  and 𝑀𝑉'()*+#,# 𝑀𝑉!"#$%&⁄ ≥ 0.1, 
where 𝑀𝑉!"#$%& and 𝑀𝑉'()*+#,# are the market values of the target and the acquiror four weeks prior 
to the merger announcement. The relative size is restricted, because if one of the participants, 
presumably the acquiror, is too much larger than the other participant, the effect of the merger may not 
be visible in the larger participant’s share price. Acquiror cannot hold 50% or more of target’s 
outstanding stock prior to the announcement, and it has to hold 100% of the target’s stock at the end of 
the merger. The event data has to be available in Thompson Reuters Eikon, and price data for the 
acquiror and the target has to be available in Thompson Reuters Datastream. 
 
I have a few additional and slightly differing data requirements for my tests of announcement period 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and three-year post-merger buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR). In order to have larger samples, I apply these requirements separately for the data I use for 
the two tests, thus ending up with two slightly different samples. I use this method, because the number 
of mergers occurring during weak economy is relatively small and using a dataset that would satisfy all 
requirements for both tests, would further narrow the sample. However, additional tests for a sample 
satisfying all requirements are conducted in section 5, and the primary results remain robust for this 
sample. Thereby, conclusions that combine results of announcement period tests and post-merger 
performance tests, can be made with relatively high confidence. 
 
Sample size for the announcement period CAR-tests is 1014 completed mergers, of which 137 occurred 
during weak economy. Mergers included in the CAR-test have to be completed within 365 days of the 
announcement date. Daily price data for the both participants of these mergers is required to be available 
in Thompson Reuters Datastream for the period from 230 days prior to the announcement to the 
completion of the merger. In addition, the stocks of the participants have to have an adequate liquidity 
in order to calculate unbiased market model parameters. Here the adequate liquidity is defined as less 
than 20 days of 0% price change during the 230- to 30-day period prior to the announcement, which is 






Requirements for the three-year BHAR-test result a slightly larger sample of 1183 completed mergers, 
of which 151 were classified as occurring during weak economy. Here the requirements for pre-merger 
price data availability have been removed, but three new requirements have been placed. First, acquiring 
company’s price data for the three-year period after the merger has to be available in Thompson Reuters 
Datastream. Bankrupt or delisted companies are included in the sample until their delisting date. 
Second, the merger has to be completed prior to 1.1.2017 and third, the primary four-digit SIC-code of 
the acquiring company has to be available in Thompson Reuters Datastream. 
 
3.2 Tests and methods 
 
The effect weak economy has on mergers’ returns is tested primarily with OLS multiple linear 
regressions. Separate tests are conducted to abnormal returns of announcement period and to abnormal 
returns of three-year post-merger period. Announcement period returns are examined with -10 + 5-day 
announcement window, and with the entire announcement period. The -10 + 5-day test is given more 
value, since it diminishes the potential distortions caused by possibly inaccurate market model 
parameters. In addition, I test the significance of differences in average abnormal returns during and 
outside of weak economy and on - and off merger waves. 
 
In both regression tests, the abnormal returns are the dependent variables, and dummy-variables 
representing time periods of weak economy are the primary explanatory variables. Because merger 
waves have been documented to have a significant effect on the abnormal merger returns (e.g Duchin 
and Schmidt (2013)), and the waves are pro-cyclical, a merger wave dummy-variable is included to 
control the presumably negative effect merger waves have on the abnormal returns of mergers occurring 
during those waves. Control variable for tender offer is also included, since e.g. Servaes (1991) finds 
tender offers yielding higher returns, than the other forms of deals. The relative size of the target and 
the acquiror is controlled with a Relative size – variable defined as the ratio of 𝑀𝑉'()*+#,# 𝑀𝑉!"#$%&⁄ , 
where 𝑀𝑉!"#$%& and 𝑀𝑉'()*+#,# are the market values of the target and the acquiror four weeks prior 
to the merger announcement. 
 
For -10 +5 - day announcement window’s and for the entire announcement period’s cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR’s), linear OLS regression models are estimated for acquiror’s, target’s and for 
combined returns, resulting total of 6 regression models. Estimated models are the following form: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽-(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘	𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽.(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟	𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) +
𝛽/(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽0(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒), 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅	equals the cumulative abnormal returns of acquiror, target or their combination during the 





merger is announced during period of weak economy, otherwise 0; merger wave dummy equals 1 if the 
merger is announced during a merger wave, otherwise 0; tender offer dummy equals 1 if the form of 
the deal is tender offer, otherwise 0; relative size is the market value of the target divided by the market 
value of the acquiror four weeks prior to the announcement. 
 
Linear regression model of the following form is estimated for the post-merger performance: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽-(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘	𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽.(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟	𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) +
𝛽/(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽0(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒),	
where 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 equals the three-year post-merger buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the acquiror, and the 
explanatory variables are defined as in the announcement period’s regressions. 
 
3.3 Calculation of abnormal announcement returns 
 
Announcement period’s abnormal returns are calculated for -10 to +5-day event window, where the 
event is the first public announcement of intentions to merge, and for the entire announcement period 
from 30 days prior to the announcement to the delisting date of the target. Adjusted stock prices of the 
merging companies are used, which eliminates the price distortions caused for example by dividend 
payments. The abnormal daily returns are constructed below. Definitions of the variables are presented 
in Table 1.  
Daily returns 𝑹𝒊,𝒕 for company i for day t are 𝑅+,& =
4!,#
4!,#$%
− 1. The abnormal returns 𝑹𝑨𝒊,𝒕	 for company 
i for day t are calculated following the CAPM: 𝑅'+,& = 𝑅+,& − 𝑟𝑓& − 𝛽+M𝑅6,& − 𝑟𝑓&N.  
 
The abnormal daily returns of acquiror and target are cumulated separately for the entire announcement 
period following the equation 𝐶𝐴𝑅+ = ∏ (1 + 𝑅'+,&) − 1
!
&7- , where 𝐶𝐴𝑅+ is the cumulative abnormal 
return for company i for the entire announcement period, T is the date the merger is completed and the  
Table 1 – Definitions of variables used in calculation of abnormal announcement returns 
Variable Definition 
𝑃+,& Closing price of company i’s stock for day t 
𝑟𝑓& 
Risk-free rate for day t: Risk-free rate is the daily 3-month T-bill rate retrieved from Thompson 
Reuters Datastream. 
𝑅6,& 
Market return for day t: Returns of SP500 index are used as the market proxy. The index value is 
downloaded from Thompson Reuters Datastream. 
𝛽+ 
Market beta for company i: Market betas are determined based on price data of period starting 





target is delisted, and t=1 is the first day of the period, starting 30 days prior to the announcement. 
Average time between the announcement and the completion is 136 days, ranging from 26 to 365 days.  
The combined, return for merger is calculated by weighting acquiror’s and target’s CAR’s with their 
market values four weeks prior to the announcement. Value of target’s shares held by the acquiror is 
subtracted from the market value of the target. 
 
Announcement returns for -10 to +5-day event window, event being the merger announcement, are also 
examined, and preferred, in order to diminish the potential distortions caused by possibly inaccurate 
market betas. The abnormal returns for -10 to +5 period are calculated with the same method than the 
abnormal returns for the entire period, with the difference of t=1 being the date 10 days prior to the 
announcement, and T being the date 5 days after the announcement. Combined returns are also 
calculated for the -10 to +5-day event window. 
 
3.4 Calculation of 3-year post-merger returns 
 
Post-merger performance is evaluated with 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) of the 
acquirors. Following Duchin and Schmidt (2013), BHAR for company i is defined as the subtraction of 
i’s benchmark’s cumulative returns from company i’s cumulative returns during the chosen time period: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅+ = ∏ (1 + 𝑅+,&)!&7- −∏ (1 + 𝑅8%9(:;"#<	+,&)!&7-   
Where 𝑅+,& is defined as in announcement period’s returns, but with monthly closing prices, t=1 is the 
month following the merger’s completion, and T is the month 36 months after the completion of the 
merger. Even though, if company i is delisted during the 36-month period, T equals the month of 
delisting. 
 
Benchmarks for companies are the Kenneth French’s 48 industry portfolios (French (2020)). 
Companies are matched with the benchmarks based on their four-digit SIC-codes. Companies’ 
benchmark returns are the equal weighted returns of their matched portfolios. Equal weighted returns 
are used, because some of the benchmark portfolios only include a few companies during some time 
periods, and thus using value weighted returns could lead to one peer company having a significant 
effect on the benchmark’s returns. 
 
As Viswanathan and Wei (2008) show, BHAR in often a significantly downwards biased measure. 
Therefore, no conclusions considering the absolute abnormal returns of companies should be done 
based on BHAR. Nevertheless, if the bias is relatively similar for the abnormal returns of companies 






3.5 Classification of weak economy 
 
I classify economic cycle to two stages; weak economy and normal or strong economy. The 
classification is based on the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) chronology of US 
Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions NBER (2020). Here weak economy is defined as time 
from the month following the peak date to 12 months after the through date. This classification leads to 
three periods of weak economy between 1990 and 2019. The first period starts in August 1990, and the 
second period starts in April 2001. Both these periods last for 20 months. The third period of weak 
economy starts in January 2008 and lasts for 30 months. In total, 70 of 360 months of the examined 
period are classified as weak-economy months. In Chart 1 periods of weak economy are compared to 
the SP500 index. Weak economy – status is given for the mergers based on their announcement dates, 
because evaluating the situation where the merger is initiated best captures the potential differences in 
motives to merge. Thereby, a merger is classified as weak economy merger if it is announced during a 
period of weak economy, even if it is taken to completion during normal or strong economy. 
 
3.6 Identification of merger waves 
 
I use a method essentially similar to Harford (2005) in identification of merger waves. I use Thompson 
Reuters Eikon data of all completed US mergers and acquisitions with a value larger than or equal to 
$50M between 1990 and 2019. Each deal is assigned to a month based on its announcement date, and 
to an industry based on Thompson Reuters Eikon’s definition of acquiror’s macro industry. Next I 
calculate for each of the three decades and for each of 12 industries1 the 24-month period of highest 
M&A activity. These 36 periods are potential merger waves. Thereby, each industry has one potential 
merger wave on each of the three decades.  
 
I test the significance of these potential waves by creating one thousand simulations for each industry i 
and decade d, where every deal placing in industry i during decade d is assigned to a new month on 
decade d drawn from even distribution. Thus, if for example 50 deals take place in industry i during 
1990’s, each of the 50 deals is individually assigned to the period between January 1990 and December 
1999 with an even probability of 1 120⁄  for each month. Simulated 24-month periods of the highest 
M&A activities are calculated for each i and d in each of the thousand simulations. If the number of 
deals on a potential wave of industry i during decade d is larger than or equal to the 95th percentile of 
the simulated numbers of highest M&A activity on industry i during decade d, the potential wave is 
identified as an actual merger wave. A vast majority of merger waves are placed in the late 1990’s and 
in the early 2000’s, as demonstrated in Chart 2. 
1) The 12 industries based on Thompson Reuters Eikon’s macro-industry definition are Consumer Products and Services, Consumer 






Chart 1 – Periods of weak economy and SP500 index 
 
Periods classified as weak-economy periods are highlighted with black on the horizontal axis. SP500 index on 
base 2 logarithmic scale is included in the chart for comparison. SP500 monthly values are downloaded from 




Chart 2 – Merger waves on industries 
 
Chart 2 presents merger waves’ timing on 12 industries. Industries are consistent with macro industry – definition 
in Thompson Reuters Eikon database. Industry definitions are presented in the left side of the chart and are 





Chart 1 – Periods of Weak economy and SP500 index 
 








4.1 Abnormal announcement returns 
 
The results of regressions of – 10 to +5 – day cumulative abnormal announcement returns (CARs) 
imply, that investors have reacted more negatively to merger announcements during weak economy. 
Coefficients of weak economy variable for acquiror’s returns and for the combined returns are -0.022 
and -0.030 respectively. Both coefficients are statistically significant. Target’s returns are also affected 
negatively by weak economy, with a coefficient -0.030, which is significant only at 10% level. Results 
of regressions of – 10 to +5 – day announcement returns are presented in Table 3.  
 
However, results of the entire announcement period’s returns – regressions do not reveal statistically 
significant differences in returns caused by weak economy. The differing results of -10 +5 – day event 
window’s and the entire announcement period’s regressions may be caused by inaccurate market model 
coefficients that are used to determine the abnormal returns, and which are expected have larger impact 
on the longer timeframe. Indeed, the results of investor’s immediate reaction during -10 to +5 – day 
event window are robust under most robustness tests, as shown in section 5, but no conclusions of weak 
economy’s effect on the entire announcement period’s returns can be made. Results of regressions of 
the entire announcement period’s returns are presented in Table 4. 
 
In my sample, mergers occurring during merger waves do not experience significantly different 
announcement returns compared to the mergers occurring outside of waves. During -10 +5 – day 
announcement window, tender offers yield higher acquiror -, target - and combined returns at 5% 
significance level. This result is consistent with several earlier studies (e.g. Servaes (1991)). During the 
entire announcement period the results are similar, but only target’s Tender offer – coefficient is 
significant at 5% level. Target’s relative size compared to the acquiror affect the target’s returns 
negatively during both timeframes. The result is reasonable; the larger the target is compared to the 
acquiror, the less likely the acquiror is to pay large premiums for the target. Servaes (1991) comes to 
the same conclusion. 
 
Consistent with most studies, average abnormal announcement returns for Acquirors are negative, 
whereas targets gain significantly, and the combined returns are slightly positive. In the entire sample, 
acquirors’ average CAR for -10 to + 5-day announcement window is -0.021, targets’ 0.192 and the 
combined CAR is 0.032.2 Servaes (1991) documents almost identical announcement returns, as he 
reports CARs of -0.011, 0.236 and 0.037 for acquirors, targets and their combinations, respectively. 
 
2) Average -10 +5-day announcement period CARs for acquirors, targets and their combination are significantly different from zero at 0.1% 





Mergers announced during weak economy and during merger waves yield by far the lowest average 
CARs for both participants and for the combination of the participants. However, due to the small 
sample size of weak economy – on wave mergers, this result is not statistically significant, as shown in 
Appendix 1, where the significance of differences in average cross-sectional announcement period 




Table 2 – Cross sectional announcement period CARs 
 
Table 2 presents average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of -10 to +5-day announcement window, 
categorized to weak or normal/strong economy and to mergers occurring during merger waves or outside of these 
waves. Marginal 1 is the marginal distribution, where the division of economy is ignored, and marginal 2 is the 
marginal distribution, where the division to on wave and out of wave mergers is ignored. CARs for the entire 
sample are presented in the bottom right corner, and n is the number of deals in each category. 
 
Table 2 - Cross sectional announcement period CARs 
  Participant Weak economy 
Normal/Strong 
economy Marginal 1 
On wave 
Acquiror -0.075 -0.019 -0.022 
Target 0.111 0.205 0.200 
Combined -0.029 0.036 0.032 
Number of mergers n = 12 n = 196 n = 208 
Off wave 
Acquiror -0.034 -0.018 -0.020 
Target 0.178 0.192 0.190 
Combined 0.011 0.035 0.031 
Number of mergers n = 125 n = 681 n = 806 
Marginal 2 
Acquiror -0.038 -0.018 -0.021 
Target 0.172 0.195 0.192 
Combined 0.007 0.035 0.032 











Tables 3 and 4 – Results of announcement period regressions 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present coefficients of regressions, where the dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) of -10 to +5 – day event window, and CARs of the entire announcement period, respectively. CARs for 
acquirors and targets are accumulated from the prediction errors of their single factor market models. Combined 
CAR’s are weighted averages of the target’s and the acquiror’s CAR’s. Regressions are estimated as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽!(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘	𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽"(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟	𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽#(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽$(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒),  
where weak economy dummy equals 1 if the merger is announced during period of weak economy; merger wave 
dummy equals 1 if the merger is announced during a merger wave; tender offer dummy equals 1 if the form of 
the deal is tender offer; relative size is the market value of the target divided by the market value of the acquiror.  
 
Correlations between the explanatory variables are low, and thus multicollinearity does not cause problems. The 
highest absolute correlation is a correlation of -0.115 between the weak economy – and merger wave variables. 
All other absolute correlations between the explanatory variables are smaller than 0.05. 
 
Significance codes of coefficients: ( . ) significant at 10% level; ( * ) significant at 5% level; ( ** ) significant at 
1% level; ( *** ) significant at 0.1% level. 
 
 
Table 3 - Regression coefficients: Announcement period -10 +5 - day event window 
  Acquiror Target Combined 
  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept (𝛼) -0.0150 0.0145 * 0.2101 2e-16 *** 0.0173 0.0040 ** 
Weak economy (𝛽!) -0.0219 0.0492 * -0.0295 0.100 . -0.0296 0.0067 ** 
Merger wave (𝛽") -0.0025 0.7940 0.0130 0.394 -0.0017 0.8550 
Tender offer (𝛽#) 0.0303 0.0160 * 0.1420 4.5e-12 *** 0.0508 4.0e-5 *** 




Table 4 - Regression coefficients: Entire announcement period 
  Acquiror Target Combined 
  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept (𝛼) -0.0152 0.271 0.2306 2e-16 *** 0.0204 0.1295 
Weak economy (𝛽!) -0.0090 0.719 -0.0045 0.8852 -0.0084 0.7308 
Merger wave (𝛽") 0.0017 0.938 0.0481 0.0691 . 0.0090 0.6612 
Tender offer (𝛽#) 0.0276 0.329 0.1312 0.0002 *** 0.0046 0.0976 . 





4.2 Abnormal three-year returns 
 
Three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) show significantly weaker post-merger 
performance of acquisitions announced during weak economy. Regression coefficient for weak 
economy variable is -0.29, which is significant at 1% level. Consistent to earlier studies (e.g Duchin 
and Schmidt (2013)) merger waves’ contribution to BHAR is negative with a coefficient of -0.19, which 
is significant at 5% level. Unlike to abnormal announcement returns, tender offer – and relative size – 
variables do not have statistically significant effects on post – merger BHAR. Three-year post-merger 
BHAR regression’s coefficients are presented in Table 6. As Viswanathan and Wei (2008) show, 
BHAR is a downwards biased measure, and thereby it should not be used as an absolute measure of 
merging companies’ performance, but only in comparison of those companies. 
 
Post-merger performance measured with average BHARs is strongest for mergers that are announced 
outside of merger waves and not during weak economy, whereas mergers announced during merger 
waves and during weak economy experience by far the weakest post-merger performance. Number of 
mergers occurring during weak economy and on wave is significantly low3, only 13 mergers of the 
sample of 1183, which is expected due to the procyclicality of merger waves. Notwithstanding the low 
number of on wave – weak economy – mergers, their average performance is weaker than mergers’ in 
other categories at 1% significance level, as shown in Appendix 2. Average cross sectional BHARs are 
consistent with the regression results. Cross sectional BHARs are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 – Cross sectional BHARs 
Table 5 presents average three-year post-merger buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) categorized to weak or 
normal/strong economy and to mergers occurring during merger waves or outside of these waves. Marginal 1 is 
the marginal distribution, where the division of economy is ignored, and marginal 2 is the marginal distribution, 
where the division to on wave and to off wave mergers is ignored. BHAR for the entire sample is presented in the 




















3) Relative frequencies of on wave – mergers are lower during weak economy at ~ 0% significance level, as shown in Appendix 3. 




economy Marginal 1 
On wave 
-0.834 -0.265 -0.290 
n = 13 n = 283 n = 296 
Off wave 
-0.354 -0.093 -0.134 
n = 138 n = 749 n = 887 
Marginal 2 
-0.396 -0.140 -0.173 





Table 6– Results of three-year post-merger BHAR regression 
 
Table 6 presents coefficients of regression, where the dependent variable is three-year post-merger buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns of the acquiring companies. BHAR for individual company is the company’s cumulative returns 
during the three-year post-merger period, less the benchmark’s cumulative returns for the same period. Kenneth 
French’s 48 industry portfolios (French (2020)) are used as the benchmarks. Regressions are estimated as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽!(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘	𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽"(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟	𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽#(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽$(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒),  
where weak economy dummy equals 1 if the merger is announced during period of weak economy; merger wave 
dummy equals 1 if the merger is announced during a merger wave; tender offer dummy equals 1 if the form of 
the deal is tender offer; relative size is the market value of the target divided by the market value of the acquiror. 
 
Correlations between the explanatory variables are low, and thus multicollinearity does not cause problems. The 
highest absolute correlation is a correlation of -0.145 between the weak economy – and merger wave variables. 
All other absolute correlations between the explanatory variables are smaller than 0.05. 
 
Significance codes of coefficients:  
 
( . ) significant at 10% level 
( * ) significant at 5% level 
( ** ) significant at 1% level 





Decomposition of BHAR shows, how the weak post-merger abnormal performance of weak economy 
– mergers is due to the strong performance of the merging companies’ benchmark portfolios. The 
average cumulative 3-year gross return of companies merging during weak economy is 0.337, which is 
higher than the gross returns of companies merging during normal or strong economy, but as the 
benchmarks yield on average a return of 0.733, the average BHAR of weak economy mergers is 
considerably negative. This can be explained with the high market growth periods often following the 
weak economical periods, as can be seen in comparison of period of weak economy and SP500 index, 
presented in Chart 1. Thereby, on average the companies that are acquirors in weak economy mergers 
do not yield especially weak post-merger gross-returns, but on the other hand they appear to perform 
significantly worse compared to their industries4. BHAR decomposition is presented in Table 7. 
 
Closer examination of measured BHARs supports the methodology and increases confidence in the 
results. In Chart 3, BHAR is presented for each month of the 3-year period. The chart demonstrates, 
how BHAR decreases at the fastest rate during the first months after the merger’s completion. After 24 
months, the decrease is insignificant5, and BHAR appears to be stabilized. Thus, it is credible to claim  
 
 
4) This should be taken with a slight reservation, since Viswanathan and Wei (2008) show that BHAR is a downwards biased measure. 
5) Significance of BHARs rate of change is analysed in Appendix 2. 
Table 6 - Regression coefficients: 3-year BHAR 
  Coefficient P-value 
Intercept (𝛼) -0.0864 0.1041 
Weak economy (𝛽!) -0.2891 0.0047 ** 
Merger wave (𝛽") -0.1899 0.0159 * 
Tender offer (𝛽#) -0.0508 0.6357 





that the negativity of BHARs is at least to some extent a result of the weakened performance of merging 
companies, instead of unsuitable benchmarks or methodology, since the rate of BHAR’s decrease 
decreases as time after the merger passes.  
 
Table 7 – BHAR decomposition 
Average cumulative three-year post-merger returns (𝑅%&') for merging companies and for their benchmarks are 
presented in Table 7. Average BHAR is 𝑅%&' of benchmarks subtracted from 𝑅%&'of the merging companies. 
 
Table 7 – BHAR decomposition 
  
Full sample Weak economy 
Normal/strong 
economy On wave Off wave 
𝑅%&' Merging companies 0.167 0.337 0.142 -0.111 0.259 
𝑅%&' Benchmarks 0.339 0.733 0.282 0.178 0.393 
Average BHAR -0.173 -0.396 -0.140 -0.290 -0.134 





Chart 3 – Post-merger BHAR for 36 months  
 
Chart 3 presents monthly post-merger BHARs for companies that are acquirors in weak – and in normal/strong 
economy mergers. Month 0 is the month the merger is completed, and the target is delisted. Monthly BHAR is 
calculated for each month t and separately for the weak- and normal/strong – economy mergers as follows:  
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅& =	





, where i is the company, 𝑛& is the number of companies in the sample  
during month t, 𝑅/,& is return of the company form month t and 𝑅01.234567	/,& is the return of company i’s benchmark for  
month t.  
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4.3 Hypothesis and the negative effect of weak economy 
 
Results of considerably weaker announcement period - and 3-year post-merger abnormal returns of 
companies merging during weak economy provide strong evidence against Hypothesis 0 - Weak 
economy does not have an effect on the abnormal merger gains. The results support H1b: Mergers 
initiated during weak economy underperform other mergers, as the weak economic stage during 
announcement has negative effect on post-merger returns and announcement period returns of the 
merging companies. Especially weak economy’s negative effect on BHAR appears to be a very robust 
result, as it remains significant in vast majority of the robustness checks. The weaker performance of 
mergers during weak economy could be a result of larger share of forced mergers, as Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) show how market undervaluation halts even economically justified mergers, and 
Harford (2005) links high capital liquidity to increased merger activity. Periods of weak economy are 
characterized by high uncertainty, low equity valuations and low liquidity, rather than high liquidity 
and equity overvaluation. Therefore, a majority of mergers occur during normal or strong economy, 
and not during weak economic stages. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that a large part of mergers 
announced during weak economy, are in fact forced mergers, and yield weaker returns since they are 
not necessarily economically justified and do not produce significant synergies. 
 
Even though there is strong evidence against H1a: Mergers initiated during weak economy outperform 
other mergers, the hypothesized factors supporting H1a are not necessarily untrue. It is feasible that 
hubris, CEO overconfidence and managerial herding are value destructive and more likely to occur 
during normal or strong economy than during weak economy. However, these factors appear to have 
smaller effect than the factors affecting merger performance negatively. As the managerial behavioral 
problems are linked in earlier studies primarily to periods of especially high merger activity, it is likely 
that the merger wave control variable absorbs their effect. Indeed, if the regressions are re-estimated 
with weak economy variable as the only explanatory variable, the weak economy – coefficients are less 
negative, while still significant.  
 
Weak economy’s negative and statistically significant coefficient in -10 to +5-day announcement 
window regression of acquiror’s returns suggests that at the time of announcement investors partly 
recognize the weaker post-merger performance of weak economy - acquirors. Also targets of weak 
economy mergers receive lower abnormal returns during the announcement window at 10% 
significance level, which could support Hypothesis 1b and the idea of larger share of forced mergers 
during weak economy. Indeed, targets of on wave mergers gain slightly larger announcement returns, 
even though not statistically significantly, than targets of out of wave mergers, whilst also on wave 
mergers underperform out of wave mergers during the three-year post-merger period. Thereby, it could 





are done by necessity and not by choice, which does not seem to be the case with on wave mergers. 
However, this result of lower announcement returns of targets could also be due to lower number of 
potential acquirors during weak economy. 
 
BHAR decomposition of Table 7 shows how weak economy mergers yield higher gross returns than 
mergers announced during normal or strong economy, but the extremely strong performance of the 
benchmarks of weak economy mergers lead to significantly weaker abnormal performance of weak 
economy mergers. If a majority of weak economy mergers are indeed forced mergers, this result is 
reasonable; The companies do not produce negative returns, but due to potential financial difficulties 
and economically unjustified mergers, their after-merger performance cannot keep up with their 
benchmarks. However, this would imply that the investors did not entirely recognize the difficulties the 
merging companies had pre-merger and that caused them to merge. Additionally, this would not mean 
that the weak economy mergers were value destructive, as it is not possible to compare the after-merger 
performance to the performance of the companies if the merger had not had happened. 
 
This study replicates several results of other studies. These are merger waves’ detrimental effect on 
post-merger returns, tender offers’ positive effect on announcement returns, acquirors’ slightly negative 
announcement returns, and slightly positive combined announcement returns of acquirors and targets. 
Consistent secondary results compared to the majority of earlier studies increase confidence in the 
results considering returns of weak economy mergers. As weak economy’s effect on announcement- 
and post-merger returns also remains negative and statistically significant in most of the robustness 
tests, it can be concluded with a high confidence, that on average mergers announced during weak 
economy yield lower abnormal returns than mergers announced during good or normal economy. 
 
 
5. Robustness of the results 
 
I test robustness of my results by re-estimating the regressions for samples, where some of the deals are 
excluded. The primary results remain robust under majority of these tests. CARs for entire 
announcement period are not examined in robustness tests, but announcement returns mentioned in this 
section are the -10 +5 – day abnormal announcement returns. In the first robustness test, I remove the 
deals announced between 1998 and 2001. In the second test, I apply all data – and deal requirements 
used in the original announcement period performance – and post-merger performance test for the 
sample used with both time frames. In the third test, deals which are placed in the lowest decile of 
combined abnormal announcement returns are excluded. In the fourth test, I exclude the deals with the 
weakest post-merger performance, and fifth, I re-estimate the regressions for sub-samples where the 





Moeller et. al (2005) point out that acquirors’ negative announcement returns during 1990’s and early 
2000’s is a result of large-loss deals between 1998 and 2001. From 1990 to 1997 abnormal 
announcement returns for acquirors are in fact positive. Thereby, for robustness test 1, I exclude all 
mergers announced between 1998 and 2001 from my sample. This reduces my announcement period 
sample size to 784 mergers, of which 103 occur during weak economy and 65 during merger waves. 
Here weak economy - regression coefficients for acquiror’s and combined returns are still negative and 
statistically significant. Targets’ weak economy coefficient is no longer significant at 10% level, but it 
also remains negative. Results considering tender offers’ and relative sizes’ coefficients remains for 
most part unchanged. Average announcement period CARs for all participants remain similar and 
significantly different form 0. Sample size for 3-year BHAR – tests is reduced to 881 mergers of which 
116 occur during weak economy and 107 during merger waves. Weak economy’s contribution to 3-
year BHAR remains negative and significant, even though the average BHAR for the used sample is 
less negative at -0.13, while it is -0.17 for the original sample. Merger waves’ coefficient in 3-year 
BHAR regression is negative, but no longer statistically significant, which is expected as number of on 
wave mergers is reduced to 107 from the original number of 296. 
 
In robustness test 2, in order to test if my results considering abnormal announcement returns and 
abnormal three-year post-merger returns can be combined, I re-estimate regressions for a unified 
sample, where all requirements for announcement period tests and for post-merger tests are applied for 
the sample. Here the sample size is 889 mergers of which 135 occur during weak economy and 198 on 
merger waves. The results of original tests remain robust with a difference that targets weak economy 
- coefficient in announcement period regression is now significantly negative at 5% level, whereas it 
was originally significant only at 10% level. Thereby, it is safe to make conclusions combining the 
results of announcement period CARs and 3-year BHARs. 
 
In robustness test 3A, I remove the first decile of deals based on their combined announcement period 
returns from the sample used in test 2, because Moeller et. al (2005) point out that the companies making 
deals with large losses during announcement period, yield weaker post-merger returns. Essentially, this 
means excluding deals with combined abnormal announcement returns lower than -0.094, and results a 
sample of 800 deals of which 114 occur during weak economy and 176 on merger waves. The sample 
of test 3, where the weakest decile of deals is removed gives higher average announcement CARs for 
all participants, as expected. Here acquirors’ average announcement period CAR is positive at 0.003, 
which however is not significantly different from 0. Weak economy coefficients of announcement 
period CAR regressions are still negative, but not statistically significant. This suggests that the weaker 
announcement CARs for weak economy mergers are partly driven by large loss deals, but as robustness 





However, in three-year BHAR regression, weak economy coefficient remains negative and statistically 
significant. Merger wave coefficient also remains negative but is significant only at 10% level. 
 
To further test the effect large losses during announcement period has on post-merger performance, in 
robustness test 3B, I re-estimate regression coefficients for the sample used in test 2, by using combined 
announcement returns as an explanatory variable for 3-year BHARs.  The announcement return variable 
has a positive regression coefficient, which is not significant. Original results of significantly negative 
weak economy – and merger wave – variables remain significant even when the announcement returns 
are used as a control variable. 
 
Fourth robustness test reveals, that weak economy’s effect on post-merger BHARs is not due to negative 
outliers, but rather the effect is visible through the entire sample. Deciles of BHARs of weak economy 
mergers are consistently weaker than the BHAR deciles of mergers during normal or strong economy. 
Additionally, I re-estimate the BHAR regression with a sample where the deals placed in the lowest 
quartile based on their BHARs is removed separately from weak economy – and normal/strong 
economy samples. For this sample, the results of weak economy’s detrimental effect remain consistent 
to the original results and significant at 5% level. Thereby, weak economy’s effect appears to be 
significant for a large part of the deals. 
 
In the fifth test, I create three sub-samples including mergers announced during periods 1990-1999, 
2000-2007 and 2008-2019. Each sample includes one period of weak economy, and thus the test reveals 
if weak economy merger’s performance is consistently weaker in each period. Weak economy’s BHAR 
regression coefficient is negative in all of the sub-samples, but it is statistically significant (at 0.1% 
level) only during the second subsample of years 2000-2007, whereas in first sample the coefficient is 
significant only at 10% level, and in the third sample the coefficient is insignificant. In announcement 
period -10 + 5 – day CAR regressions the weak economy coefficients for the combined CARs are 
negative in the second and third sub-samples at 10% and 5% significance levels, whereas in the first 
sub-sample the coefficient is insignificantly positive. Even though the significance levels are lower, and 
the results are not as conclusive than with the entire sample, the observed effect appears to be present 







6. Limitations and future research 
 
Based on my results, it can be said with a high confidence, that US to US mergers of public companies 
between 1990 and 2019 occurring during weak economy yield lower abnormal announcement - and 3-
year post-merger returns, than mergers occurring during normal or good economy. However, even 
though larger share of forced mergers during weak economy is a very potential explanation for the 
weaker performance, this study does not provide conclusive evidence for that being the case. Indeed, 
there might be other explanations for the documented weak performance, that are yet not recognized. 
Additionally, this subject has not received extensive academic attention, and thereby there are no strictly 
similar studies published in major academic journals of finance, that could be used as comparison. 
Therefore, based on this study, no generalization of the results to other markets and time periods can be 
made with a high certainty.  
 
In the used data and methods, there are three issues that should be taken into consideration. First, 
classification of weak economy can be done with several different methods. Here, the assumption of 
weak economic situation being the period from peak date to twelve months after the through date does 
not take into consideration the possible differences in the time economy takes to recover after different 
downward shocks. Additionally, the simplified classification to weak – and normal/strong – economy 
is not strictly realistic. Despite the issues, this method is chosen for simplicity and to diminish the risk 
of researcher biases that could occur if a more subjective method of classification were used. Second, 
general hypothesis of distribution of prediction errors in linear regressions are satisfied relatively well, 
as shown in Appendix 5. Even though, in the three – year BHAR regression model, there are a few 
substantially large outliers. However, removing these outliers from the regression do not change the 
regression coefficients significantly, and the results remain robust. Third, T-tests are used to determine 
if the CARs and BHARs are significantly different from 0, even as the T-test’s general hypothesis of 
normally distributed observations is not satisfied. Still, as most of the examined samples are large, T-
tests give fairly reliable results. 
 
The documented negative effect weak economic situation during announcement period has on merger 
gains is a largely undocumented phenomenon, which gives room for future research. This subject could 
be researched in more depth in order to either replicate or challenge the results of this thesis with 
different samples and methods. The motives for weak economy mergers should be examined more 










In this thesis, I establish a largely undocumented relationship between weak economic situation during 
merger announcement and weakened abnormal returns of the merging companies. Regression results 
for announcement returns, measured with cumulative abnormal returns, during -10 + 5-day 
announcement period show weak economy having a negative effect on the acquirors and the combined 
returns at 5% significance level. Targets’ returns are also affected negatively but only at 10% 
significance level. Weak economy affects negatively also the abnormal returns during the entire 
announcement period, but these regression coefficients are not significant. The difference in the 
significance of the results may be due to the possibly inaccurate market betas that are expected to have 
a larger effect during the longer timeframe. Regression test of three-year post-merger abnormal returns 
measured with buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) show weak economy having a significant and 
negative effect on the post-merger performance. Especially the results of the BHAR regression are 
proven to be very robust under the robustness tests. 
 
Null hypothesis of weak economy during the merger announcement not having an effect on abnormal 
merger gains is rejected. A potential reason for the negative effect, I document weak economy having 
on the abnormal returns of the merging companies, is that a large share of weak economy mergers 
would be forced mergers. This argument is supported by findings of Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004) considering market undervaluation’s tendency to halt also economically justified mergers, and 
the positive effect high liquidity has on merger activity documented by Harford (2005). Thereby, a large 
part of weak economy mergers may indeed be forced mergers that are done by necessity. This could 
explain the weaker performance of weak economy mergers, as Duchin and Schmidt (2013) reason that 
forced mergers are expected to yield lower returns than other mergers. 
 
In this study, I also replicate results of earlier studies. I document mergers occurring during merger 
waves having a significantly weakened post-merger performance, and these waves being pro-cyclical. 
Furthermore, even though the on wave weak economy mergers are an exception, there appears to be a 
combined effect of merger waves and weak economy leading to the far worst announcement period – 
and post-merger performance in my sample. However, this result is driven by the mergers announced 
in late 2001’s and due to the exceptional merger markets in the early 2000’s this result may not be 
consistent over time. Other well-known phenomena replicated in this study are the slightly negative 
announcement returns of the acquirors, and significantly positive announcement returns of the targets. 
Additionally, tender offers’ positive effect on the announcement returns of the targets and the acquirors, 






Even though the weak economy’s negative effect on merging companies’ returns is statistically 
significant and remains robust under the majority of the robustness tests, this study does not provide 
conclusive evidence on the factors leading to the weakened performance. A large share of mergers 
occurring during weak economy being forced mergers is a potential explanation for the results, but there 
may be other explanations for the phenomenon that are not yet recognized. However, the in-depth 
examination of the factors resulting the weakened performance is outside of the scope of this study. As 
the documented effect of weak economy is previously largely unrecognized, future research aiming to 
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Appendix 1 – Analysis of average -10+5 - day announcement period CARs 
 
Average -10 +5 - day announcement period CARs for acquirors, targets and their combinations are -
0.021, -0.192 and 0.032, respectively. Each participants’ average CARs are different from zero at 0.1% 
significance level. Significance of the average CARs is tested with T-tests, and even though T-test’s 
general hypothesis of normally distributed observations is not satisfied6, due to the large sample the 
results are relatively valid. The test is conducted as follows: 
𝑇 = >'?9:9
;<9
RRRRRR, where 𝐶𝐴𝑅@RRRRRRR is the average CAR for participant i, 𝜎+ is the standard deviation of CARs of 
participant i and 𝑛+ is the number of deals. As 𝑛+ large, at 1014, T~N(0,1). Thereby, P-values for the 
tests can be estimated based on cumulative normal distribution. Results of the T-tests are presented in 
Table 8. Code *** represents significance at 0.1% level. 
Table 8: T-test of average CARs 
 Acquiror Target Cobined 
Avg -0.0207 0.1921 0.0316 
n 1014 1014 1014 
sd 0.1206 0.2014 0.1196 
t-stat -5.47 30.38 8.40 
P-value 2.272E-08 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 
Significance *** *** *** 
 
Additionally, I test the significance of differences between the cross-sectional CARs presented in section 
4.1 in Table 2. The differences are tested with Welch’s T-tests. Average -10+5-day announcement 
period CARs between On- and Off-wave mergers do not differ significantly from each other in any of 
the economic stages. However, average combined CARs between weak economy mergers and 
normal/strong economy mergers do differ at 5% significance level in off – wave sample and in the entire 
sample. In on-wave sample the difference is considerable, but not significant due to the extremely small 
sample of weak economy on-wave mergers. These results are consistent with the regression results of -
10 + 5 – day announcement returns; Merger waves do not have significant effect on announcement 
CARs, whereas economic stage has a significant effect. There are signals of combined negative effect 
of weak economy and merger waves, but due to the rarity of these mergers, the result is not statistically 
significant. 
 
6) Normality of CARs’ distribution is tested with 𝜒=-distribution test. CARs are not normally distributed. Visual review of 
histogram of the distribution shows that CARs’ distribution resembles normal distribution, but the null hypothesis of normality 





Appendix 2 – Analysis of average BHARs 
 
Average cross sectional three-year post-merger BHARs are significantly different from each other at 
1% levels. I test the significance with Welch’s T-tests. Test’s general hypothesis of normally distributed 
BHARs is not satisfied7, but as majority of the samples are large, the results are reasonable valid. 
However, the results of significance of on wave – weak economy – mergers should be taken with a 
slight reservation due to the small sample of 13 mergers. Average BHARs and P-values are presented 
in Table 9. Row P-values 1 presents P-values for difference of average BHARs of on wave and Off 
wave mergers in different economical stages. Column P-values 2 presents P-values for difference of 
average BHARs of mergers during weak economy and during normal/strong economy, in on wave and 
Off wave samples.  
Significance codes of the T-tests: ( ** ) significant at 1% level; ( *** ) significant at 0.1% level. 
Table 9 - Cross sectional BHARs an P-values 
  
Weak economy P-values 2 Normal/strong economy Marginal 
On wave 
-0.834 
P-value: BHARs of On 
wave -mergers are not 




n = 13 0.0014 ** n = 283 n = 296 
P-values 1 
P-value: BHARs of On 
wave and Off wave 
mergers are not same 
during Weak economy 
 
P-value: BHARs of On 
wave and Off wave 
mergers are not same 
during Normal/strong 
economy 
P-value: BHARs of On 
wave and Off wave 
mergers are not same 
0.0053 **   0.0025 ** 0.0027 ** 
Off wave 
-0.354 
P-value: BHARs of Off 
wave -mergers are not 




n = 138 0.0020 ** n = 749 n = 887 
Marginal 
-0.396 
P-value: BHARs of 
mergers are not same 




n = 151 0.0008 *** n = 1032 N = 1183 
 
7) Normality of BHARs’ distribution is tested with 𝜒=-distribution test. BHARs are not normally distributed. Visual review of 
histogram of the distribution shows that BHARs’ distribution resembles normal distribution, but the null hypothesis of 





The results of significant differences between average BHARs of each category is consistent with results 
of the three-year BHAR regression; Weak economic stage and merger wave during the merger 
announcement are both related to weaker after-merger performance. These differences remain consistent 
when the sample is divided into the four categories of Table 9, and the performance of on wave – weak 
economy – mergers is significantly worst of the performances of the categories, as expected based on 
the regression results.  
 
In section 4.2 Chart 3, I present BHARs for 36 months after completion of mergers. BHAR appears to 
first decrease rapidly, and to stabilize after 24 months. I examine average BHARs during 3-month 
periods in order to test this appearing stabilization. Indeed, in each 3-month period 0 to 24 months after 
merger, average 3-month BHARs of the companies are negative and significant at 5% level. From 
month 24 to month 36, all average 3-month BHARs are insignificant. This result increases BHAR’s 
credibility as a measure of mergers’ effect on post-merger returns, because the mergers’ effect appears 
to be first at its strongest, and then gradually weaker, and finally insignificant. The three-month mergers 
and their significance levels are presented in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 – Average 3-month BHARs 
Table 10 presents the average 3-month BHARs for the 3-year post-merger period. Average 3-month BHARs are 













 , where 𝑟(,* is return for company i in month t, and 
𝑟./0123-43,4 is return for company i’s benchmark industry in month t.  
Average 3-month BHAR is simple average of company specific BHARs of companies that have remained publicly 
listed at the 3-month period in question. Significance codes for the average BHAR being unequal to zero are the 
following:  
( . ) significant at 10% level; ( * ) significant at 5% level; ( ** ) significant at 1% level; ( *** ) significant at 0.1% level. 
 
Table 10 - Average 3-month BHARs 
Months after 0 - 3 3 - 6 6 - 9 9 - 12 12 - 15 15 - 18 18 - 21 21 - 24 24 - 27 27 - 30 30 - 33 33 - 36 
Average BHAR -0.029 -0.016 -0.022 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.013 -0.014 -0.003 -0.007 0.053 -0.010 
n 1183 1181 1180 1170 1156 1133 1117 1110 1093 1076 1055 1040 
𝜎  0.207 0.254 0.238 0.214 0.230 0.235 0.233 0.269 0.234 0.220 2.309 0.219 
T-stat -4.907 -2.110 -3.116 -2.803 -2.710 -2.632 -1.867 -1.692 -0.471 -1.089 0.739 -1.412 
P-value 0.0000 0.0175 0.0009 0.0026 0.0034 0.0043 0.0311 0.0455 0.3190 0.1382 0.2301 0.0792 







Appendix 3 – Frequencies of on wave mergers 
 
In my sample, frequencies of on wave mergers are significantly higher during normal/strong economy 
than during weak economy. This result is consistent with the largely recognized procyclicality of merger 
waves. I test the relative frequencies of on-wave mergers with 𝜒.- homogeneity test. I use the sample 
of the 3-year post-merger BHAR test. The null hypothesis of the test is homogenic distributions between 
rows and between columns. Actual observed frequencies of mergers in each category, and the expected 
frequencies based on the null hypothesis, are presented in Table 11. 
 




+  , 
where i is the category, 𝐹F! is the 
observed frequency in the category, 
and 𝐹G! is the expected frequency in 
the category.  
 
Now 𝜒. ≈ 24.85, and the null 







Table 11 - 𝜒.-homogeneity test 
Observed frequencies 
  Weak economy 
Normal/strong 
economy Marginal 2 
On wave 13 283 296 
Off wave 138 749 887 
Marginal 1 151 1032 1183 
      
Expected frequencies 
  Weak economy 
Normal/strong 
economy Marginal 2 
On wave 37.78 258.22 296 
Off wave 113.22 773.78 887 





Appendix 4 - Regression results for the robustness tests 
 
In this section, I present regression tables for the robustness tests 1 to 4 introduced in section 5. 
Regressions in robustness tests are the forms: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽!(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘	𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽"(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟	𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽#(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽$(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) 
and 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽!(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘	𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽"(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟	𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽#(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽$(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) 
Significance codes for the regression coefficients are:  
( . ) significant at 10% level; ( * ) significant at 5% level; ( ** ) significant at 1% level; ( *** ) significant at 0.1% level. 
 
 
Robustness test 1 
In robustness test 1, deals announced between 1998 and 2001 are removed from the original samples. 
Sample size for the announcement period test is 784 mergers, of which 103 occur during weak economy 
and 65 during merger waves. 3-year BHAR-test’s sample size is 881 mergers, of which 116 occur 
during weak economy and 107 during merger waves. Average CARs for all participants are different 
from zero at 0.1% significance level. 3-year BHAR is different from zero at 1% level. Averages are 
similar to the original sample. 
 
Table 12 - Robustness test 1: -10 +5 - day announcement window 
  Acquiror Target Combined 
  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept -0.0066 0.2914 0.2199 2e-16 *** 0.0250 3.8e-5 ** 
Weak economy -0.0226 0.0496 * -0.0245 0.190 -0.0301 0.0065 ** 
Merger wave 0.0116 0.4105 -0.0261 0.253 0.0011 0.9350 
Tender offer 0.0204 0.1147 0.1256 3.0e-9 *** 0.0392 0.0016 ** 
Relative size -0.0226 0.0138* -0.0847 1.7e-8 *** 0.0189 0.0315 * 
 
 
Table 13 - Robustness test 1: 3-year BHAR 
  Coefficient P-value 
Intercept -0.0646 0.3154 
Weak economy -0.2690 0.0356 * 
Merger wave -0.1617 0.2217 
Tender offer -0.1036 0.4449 








Robustness test 2 
In robustness check 2, all requirements for announcement period tests and for post-merger tests are 
applied for the sample used in both tests. Here the sample size is 889 mergers, of which 135 occur 
during weak economy and 198 occur during merger waves. Average CARs for all participants and 
average 3-year BHAR are similar to the averages of the original sample and are all significantly 
different from zero at 0.1% level.  
 
 
Table 14 - Robustness test 2: -10 +5 - day event window 
  Acquiror Target Combined 
  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept -0.0128 0.0577 . 0.2188 2e-16 *** 0.0213 0.0012 ** 
Weak economy -0.0258 0.0262 * -0.0377 0.0407 * -0.0346 0.0023 ** 
Merger wave -0.0034 0.7333 0.0041 0.7930 -0.0054 0.5844 
Tender offer 0.0288 0.0321 * 0.1309 1.2e-9 *** 0.0449 0.0007 *** 
Relative size -0.0102 0.2328 -0.0633 3.6e-6 *** 0.0306 0.0003*** 
 
 
Table 15 - Robustness test 2: 3-year BHAR 
  Coefficient P-value 
Intercept -0.0723 0.2975 
Weak economy -0.2942 0.0141 * 
Merger wave -0.2318 0.0250 * 
Tender offer -0.1995 0.8855 







Robustness test 3 
In robustness test 3A, the first decile of deals is removed based on their combined announcement period 
returns from the sample used in test 2. Here the sample size is 800 mergers, of which 114 occur during 
weak economy and 176 occur during merger waves. Average CAR of acquirors is here slightly positive, 
but not significant. Average targets’ and combined CARs are both approximately 3% larger than in the 
original sample, and significant at 0.1% level. Average 3-Year BHAR, at -0.127, is less negative than 
in the original sample, but still significant at 1% level. 
 
Table 16 - Robustness test 3A: -10 +5 - day event window 
  Acquiror Target Combined 
  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept 0.0023 0.7069 0.2290 2e-16 *** 0.0345 1.3e-9 *** 
Weak economy -0.0034 0.7546 -0.0147 0.4364 -0.0092 0.3630 
Merger wave 0.0061 0.4975 0.0174 0.2753 0.0057 0.5024 
Tender offer 0.0218 0.0673 . 0.1236 5.3e-9 *** 0.0374 0.0009 *** 
Relative size -0.0048 0.5351 -0.0461 0.0007 *** 0.0414 1.5e-8 *** 
 
Table 17 - Robustness test 3A: 3-year 
BHAR 
  Coefficient P-value 
Intercept -0.0391 0.6021 
Weak economy -0.2667 0.0472 * 
Merger wave -0.2203 0.0520 . 
Tender offer -0.0211 0.8877 
Relative size 0.0015 0.9873 
 
In robustness test 3B, the sample of test 2 is used for 3-year BHAR regression, and announcement 
period combined CAR is used as a control variable. 
Table 18 - Robustness test 3B: 3-year BHAR, combined 
announcement returns as explanatory factor 
  Coefficient P-value 
Intercept -0.0750 0.2830 
Weak economy -0.2899 0.0162 * 
Merger wave -0.2311 0.0255 * 
Tender offer -0.0256 0.8544 
Relative size 0.0212 0.8115 





Robustness test 4 
 
In robustness test 4, I remove quartiles of worst post-merger performing weak economy – and normal 
economy mergers. The sample size for this test is 888 mergers, of which 114 occur during weak 
economy and 208 during merger waves. Test 4 is conducted only to post-merger BHARs. In table 19 
are the regression results for the test, and in Table 20 are the deciles of BHARs of the original sample 
of the BHAR test. Deciles during weak economy are consistently lower than during normal or strong 
economy. 
 
Table 19 - Robustness test 4 
  Coefficient P-value 
Intercept 0.1630 0.0131 * 
Weak economy -0.2794 0.0232 * 
Merger wave -0.1812 0.0627 . 
Tender offer -0.0130 0.9214 
Relative size 0.0297 0.7182 
 
 
Table 20: Deciles of BHARs of weak economy - and 
normal/strong economy mergers 
Percentile BHAR: weak economy BHAR: normal economy 
0.1 -1.282 -0.976 
0.2 -0.995 -0.663 
0.3 -0.792 -0.488 
0.4 -0.621 -0.367 
Median -0.480 -0.240 
0.6 -0.338 -0.096 
0.7 -0.107 0.060 
0.8 0.088 0.249 







Appendix 5 - Distributions of regression model prediction errors 
 
General hypotheses for linear regressions are the following: Prediction errors should be uncorrelated, 
errors have standard variance, expected error is 0 and errors are not depended on the explanatory 
variables. In this section, I asses these requirements visually. There are no major conflicts between the 
general hypotheses and the observed distribution of prediction errors of neither, -10+5 -day CAR-
model, nor BHAR-model. However, there is one significant outlier in BHAR-model8. Even though, 
removing this observation does not change the regression results significantly. 
 
 
-10+5-day CAR regression model prediction errors 
 
-10 + 5-day CAR – prediction model for company i is as follows:  
𝐸/(𝐶𝐴𝑅) = 𝛼 + 𝛽*(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘	𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦/) + 𝛽=(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟	𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦/) + 𝛽A(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦/) +
𝛽B(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒/)  
= −0.015 − 0.0219(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘	𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦/) − 0.0025(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟	𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦/) +
0.0303(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦/) − 0.0114(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒/)  
 
CAR prediction error for company i is 𝐸/(𝐶𝐴𝑅) − 𝐶𝐴𝑅/. 
 
CAR prediction errors for -10+5-day announcement window are presented only for the combined 
CARs. However, errors of acquirors’ and targets’ returns are distributed very similar to the errors of 





In Chart 4, horizontal axis is the announcement date of the merger. Vertical axis is the magnitude of the 















23.12.1988 15.6.1994 6.12.1999 28.5.2005 18.11.2010 10.5.2016








In Chart 5, on the left side are the prediction errors during normal/strong economy, and on the right side the 
prediction errors during weak economy. In Chart 6, on the left side are the prediction errors off merger waves, 
and on the right side, prediction errors on merger waves. 
 
 
In Chart 7, on the horizontal axis is the relative size of 𝑀𝑉53-6/* 𝑀𝑉%178(-9-⁄ . In Chart 8, on the left side are the 














Chart 5: -10 +5 day 
announcement CAR model 










Chart 6: -10 +5 day 
announcement CAR model 










Chart 8: -10 +5 day 
announcement CAR model 
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Chart 7: -10 +5 day 
announcement CAR model 






3-year post-merger BHAR regression model prediction errors 
 
3-year post-merger BHAR – prediction model for company i is as follows:  
𝐸/(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅) = 𝛼 + 𝛽*(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘	𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦/) + 𝛽=(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟	𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦/) + 𝛽A(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦/) +
𝛽B(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒/)  
= −0.0864 − 0.2891(𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘	𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦/) − 0.1899(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟	𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦/) −
0.0508(𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟	𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦/) + 0.0078(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒/)  
 




In Chart 9, horizontal axis is the announcement date of the merger. Vertical axis is the magnitude of the 
prediction error.  
 
 
In Chart 10, on the left side are the prediction errors during normal/strong economy, and on the right side the 
prediction errors during weak economy. In Chart 11, on the left side are the prediction errors off merger waves, 
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Chart 10 - BHAR regression 
model prediction errors and 








Chart 11 - BHAR regression 
model prediction errors and 






In Chart 12, on the horizontal axis is the relative size of 𝑀𝑉53-6/* 𝑀𝑉%178(-9-⁄ . In Chart 13, on the left side are 
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Chart 12 - BHAR regression 
model prediction errors and 








Chart 13 - BHAR regression 
model prediction errors and 
tender offer - variable
